Lockhart Nuke Watch FAQ
Questions we should be asking about Oklo’s Groves radioactive isotope production reactor.
Why should I be concerned about a nuclear reactor in Lockhart?
The Groves radioactive isotope facility being built by Oklo in Lockhart, Texas has received very little publicity until now. When starting this research, the only available materials were slick press releases and almost impenetrable regulatory documents.
This site seeks to correct that and raise awareness of a consequential decision that is being made for the people and living creatures of Lockhart, Texas and the surrounding Central Texas area, whether they are aware or not.
Projects like Groves are being fast tracked under sweeping changes made to nuclear safety directives under the Trump administration starting in 2025. This is not a political issue, but a safety issue. Read the previous link, review the changes in the wording, the side-by-side before and after changes. Ask yourself why the language has been so softened and compromised.
Keep these changes in mind when reviewing the questions and their researched context below. Operating a nuclear reactor, even a small one, is a serious undertaking that demands transparency and accountability to the lives of the people depending on its responsible design and stewardship.
The questions below are based on research conducted in pursuit of what that should look like, and how to even know how to ask for it.
As a central Texans, these are the kinds of questions we should be asking, for our future, our children and grandchildren’s futures.
Why were FOIA requests made for the Groves site?
There is no confirmation that any of the linked NRC documents referenced below describe the same VIPR reactor Oklo is building at the Groves site in Lockhart, Texas.
A search for “Groves”, “Lockhart” or “Texas” on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) document site [ADAMS] and Department of Energy (DOE) document sites does not yield any meaningful results. The closest sources refer to a cancelled reactor project of the same namesake “VIPR”. You can confirm this for yourself by browsing the NRC ADAMS link.
Oklo claims that this site will go “critical” by July 4, 2026. To try and understand exactly what that means, FOIA requests have been filed with the NRC and DOE requesting specific documentation on the reactor design and operation, environmental impacts, safety and waste handling procedures at the Groves site. The lack of this kind of information for a nuclear site is unprecedented and highly irregular.
It is also clear that Oklo / Atomic Alchemy does not want certain information about this reactor to be available to the public, as demonstrated in this request to withhold proprietary information from public disclosure [https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2522/ML25225A109.pdf].
This withholding request was granted – which may be why there is no documentation – but with the following caveat:
Withholding from public inspection shall not affect the right, if any, of persons properly and directly concerned to inspect the documents.
Answers to safety concerns are of legitimate interest and a direct concern to central Texans.
You also should understand that the NRC may have cause to review this determination in the future, for example, if the scope of a Freedom of Information Act request includes your information.
Both FOIA requests to the NRC and DOE have been acknowledged as of May 8, 2026.
What are the technical specifications of the nuclear reactor Oklo is building in Lockhart?
Unconfirmed and unknown at time of writing.
The Lockhart Groves facility is believed to be a VIPR [link] [link] reactor, technology purchased by Oklo in their recent acquisition of Atomic Alchemy in 2025.
The closest technical specifications for a VIPR reactor publicly available on the NRC website are found here: [https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2525/ML25255A220.pdf]. It most likely describes a previous Atomic Alchemy project involving the VIPR design which was cancelled, known as Meitner-1. It shares the same docket number and publication date with other Meitner-1 documents. While this docket cannot be assumed to be the same reactor as Groves, the open source information on this project provides a useful framework for exploring the potential impacts the Groves reactor may have, and what kinds of specific questions might hold its owner Oklo accountable to the people of Lockhart and central Texas.
It is unknown whether these are the same technical specifications as the Groves facility, especially in light of the proprietary withholding granted to Oklo by the NRC in February 2026.
With that context, a summary of the VIPR specifications found reveal:
- A maximum thermal output power of 16.80 MWt (thermal megawatts of heat)
- A shutdown or low power output of 500 kWt (thermal kilowatts of heat)
Watts are a measure of energy transfer. It can be confusing to see “watts” because electrical power transfer is also measured in watts. The energy transfer in this context is heat energy, produced as a byproduct of the nuclear reaction used to bombard various materials with neutrons produced by the reactor. That is how various radioactive isotopes are produced for medical and other uses.
This heat must be removed by the water cooling system. If it is not removed, eventually the reactor overheats must be shutdown immediately, in an emergency event called SCRAM. If that fails to happen – perhaps a moving part gets stuck – the core literally melts, the reaction runs uncontrolled and integrity of the site may be breached. That is essentially what happened at Chornobyl and Fukishima.
What kind of fuel is used?
Unconfirmed and unknown at time of writing.
We can only infer based on the cancelled Meitner-1 VIPR reactor description on the NRC website [https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2525/ML25255A207.pdf].
That document describes a reactor of similar power output (up to 16.8 MWt in section 4.6.1) which uses pellets of Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel.
This document also describes 4 reactors, which is consistent with Meitner-1. Lockhart is the “pilot program” described in this article, the successor to that cancelled project.
Assuming Lockhart is getting one of these, there are further questions to ask.
What are the riskiest operations performed on the reactor?
Section 4.1 of the reactor description [https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2525/ML25255A207.pdf] describes significant event in the regular operation of the reactor:
The most significant reactor transient, apart from startup and shutdown, occurs with the deliberate insertion or removal of high-reactivity irradiation targets while the system is operational. These target movements are planned and executed to ensure that no reactivity limits are exceeded, and that the operating reactor is maintained in a safe state.
How often does this event take place?
It is likely to be often, because this is how the reactor turns a profit for its operator; materials go in, isotopes come out, they are sold. It’s an isotope factory – the core purpose of its functioning. The frequency is likely a function of the time it takes to irradiate a specific desired isotope to the desired specifications and the manufacturing process efficiency of the site. A commercial manufacturing site is profit-motivated to maximize throughput and yield – unlike a research reactor at a public university.
The frequency of this event is an important factor to consider, taken with the probability of an incident during such an event. Each occurrence is another roll of that dice: what are the odds?
What happens if the target material becomes stuck or jammed in the reactor? How is this handled?
This is particularly concerning for two reasons:
- The light water pools have to be biologically sealed from operators and personnel in the reactor room. This is necessary because the reactor produces Nitrogen-16, a highly radioactive isotope in gaseous form, which bubbles up from the core. Not great, not terrible. It has a short half-life of about 7 seconds and decays to stable daughter elements – but will damage those breathing it in the room while it lasts.
- The core is surrounded by a sealed heavy water tank, some of which consists of tritium. The next section goes into more detail about tritium hazards.
With both the light water and heavy water tank within sealed, how would such an incident be mitigated?
If target material were to become stuck, could it increase the reactivity beyond acceptable limits?
Could stuck target material prevent an emergency shutdown of the reactor?
Tritium
How much tritium is produced by the reactor?
Tritium is the heaviest isotope of hydrogen, produced by the VIPR reactor in a heavy water tank which surrounds the core. The Meitner-1 auxillary systems documentation [https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2525/ML25255A212.pdf] describes the need for a tritium cleanup system:
The principal radiation hazard associated with the heavy-water reflector is tritium (H-3), which is produced by the activation of deuterium and removed by decay. However, because the half-life of H-3 is 12.2 years, the concentration will rise nearly linearly and without bound. The presence of H-3 in the heavy water necessitates precautions to minimize exposure during both routine maintenance and unforeseen events, such as a spill of heavy water
Tritium is dangerous when inhaled or consumed in contaminated molecules such as water. The tritium atoms produce beta radiation which damage organisms from the inside, as the body absorbs these atoms.
How is tritium regularly removed from the system?
This is required in the design, but it is not defined, and needs to be confirmed for
Where does it go once removed? How is it transported?
How are heavy water leaks managed and cleaned up?
What are the risks of leakage into the environment?
How will incidents be reported to the local community?
What are the reporting requirements for incidents?
How well are first responders prepared for and trained to handle radioactive incidents in the area?
What security measures are in place to prevent terrorism or theft of dangerous materials?
What are the chain of custody and reporting requirements around fuel, irradiated materials and radioactive waste?
How is site security maintained? How is it audited, and how often?
What else do you wish you knew about this Lockhart nuclear reactor?
Email: contact@lockhartnuke.watch with your questions and concerns. All we have is each other.